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Sol Worth and the Study of Visual Communications
Larry Gross
The central thread that runs through Sol Worth's research
and writings is the question of how meaning is communicated through visual images. 1 Coming to academic life
after careers in painting, photography, and filmmaking,
Worth was imbued with the conviction that visual media
were forms of communication that, while fundamentally
different from speech, could and must be seriously
examined as ways human beings create and share meanings. Focusing on film he began with the question, "What
does a film communicate, and how does this process
work?" (1966:322). The answers he began with grew out
of his practice as a teacher of film.

Teaching Film as Communication
In Worth's initial experience in teaching film, as Fulbright
Professor in Finland (1956-1957), he had utilized a
method he later described as follows: "The teacher would
make a film; the students would work along with him,
learning and doing at the same time. Class discussions
would be held in which the various aspects of the film
were developed and demonstrated" (1963:54). The film
he made during this process of teaching was Teatteri,
now in the permanent collection of the Museum of Modern Art. When he came to the Annenberg School of
Communications at the University of Pennsylvania to set
up and teach a course in documentary film, however,
Worth adopted a different approach: the students would
make a film. This choice was decisive in orienting him
toward questions and perspectives that influenced all his
subsequent work. It led Worth to consider problems few
film scholars had posed or pursued.
The most immediate consequence of this pedagogical
decision was a concern over the inexperience of his students:
The young men and women in my class were bright, but they
had never before made a film. They had never used a camera,
edited a shot, or written a script. There was not enough time.
And I was worried. If I made a film, I could control it; if I let thE
students make their own films, they could fail. The films migh1
be bad or unfinished, the cameras and equipment might be
ruined, film might be wasted. [1963:55]
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This concern proved unfounded. The students succeeded in making films and the workshop technique
seemed to engage them in the process Worth deemed
appropriate to a school of communications:
The process of changing back and forth from conception as
paramount, to the actual visual document as paramount,
seems to me the key learning process in the Documentary
Film Workshop. It is the way in which the students learn to
see. It is the process by which they train themselves to find a
meaningful visual image in relation to a concept which is
usually literary or philosophical in nature. The purpose of the
Workshop is not to produce films (this is our pleasure), but
rather, to provide an environment in which students learn to
see filmically; to provide an environment where they can learn
about the techniques and the thinking necessary to communicate ideas through the filmed image. [1963:56f]

It was the final stage in the Workshop, however, that led
Worth to the next set of questions. When the films were
completed, they were screened before an audience of
students, friends, and faculty. "It is in the period after the
lights go on, when the comments are made, that the student begins to know how very complex and difficult the
art of film communication is" (1963:57). The students
weren't alone, as Worth himself became increasingly intrigued by a pattern he found in the responses of diverse
audiences to the films made by his students:
The greatest involvement, identification, and understanding
seems to come from the young and the untrained. The
greatest hostility and incomprehension seems to come from
the adult professional in the communication fields .... Adolescents find these films easier to understand than do adults.
[1965:12]

The Bio-Documentary
In trying to make sense of this unexpected pattern of
responses Worth first clarified the nature of the films he
was screening. He realized that the inexperience of the
student filmmakers (their lack of socialization in traditional film codes), and his insistence that "the subject
~atter evolves from the student's own interests and expenences" (1963:56), lead to a particularly subjective kind
of film. Worth called this kind of film "bio-documentary":
... a film that can be made by a person who is not a professional filmmaker; or by someone who has never made a film
before. It is a film that can be made by anyone with enough
skill, let's say, to drive a car; by a person of a different culture
or a different age group, who has been taught in a specific '
way to make a film that helps him to communicate to us, the
world as he sees it, and his concerns as he sees them.
[1964:3]
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In posing the concept of a bio-documentary Worth was
clearly concerned with analogies between subjective
films and dreams as forms of visual imagery:
A bio-documentary is a film made by a person to show how he
feels about himself and his world. It is a subjective way of
showing what the objective world that a person sees is really
like . . .. In addition ... it often captures feelings and reveals
values, attitudes, and concerns that lie beyond the conscious
control of the maker. [1964:3]

But it wasn't enough to see the bio-documentary as a
subjective, individual statement by a novice filmmaker.
That might explain why adults could not "understand"
these films, and especially why "hostility seems to be
found most frequently among filmmakers, film critics, and
communications professionals . .. (e.g. 'I think you are
intellectually irresponsible to teach young people to
make films like this ... I think the whole thing is a hoax
.. .')" (1965:7). After all, it is hardly a novel observation
that those most engaged with a set of conventions in art
are the most outraged at innovations or variations that
ignore, challenge, or undermine these conventions.
It still remained to ask why young viewers responded
with enjoyment and understanding; after all, even if they
were not professionals, they were used to seeing "conventional" films. Worth decided that there was something
in the subject matter and the structure of the films that
was comprehensible to young viewers because it was
closer to their way of talking and thinking. In particular he
felt that the films used ambiguities and hints in a fashion
that adults were no longer comfortable with, but which
younger viewers found "safer and more c.omfortable fo~.
certain themes than [they] would an outnght statement
(1965:18).
.
Although he himself probably d1d not see the Implications of his inquiries at this point, Worth was laying some
of the foundations for an important analytic shift that
gradually became explicit in his thin~ing. I b~lieve that he
was already expressing some uneasmess w1th the psychological approach noted above-e.g., bio-documentaries as "dream-1 ike" revelations of the unconscious. Although much of Worth's research on film during th.e rest of
the 1960s is clearly dominated by the psychological
model of individual expression, he increasingly focused
his attention (often simultaneously, even contradictorily)
on film as cultural communication. Even at this point,
then, Worth was beginning to formulate two rel~te.d sets
of questions which he pursued for the rest of h1s l1fe.
First, he was led to tackle the question of how m~aning
can be communicated in various modes and med1a: are
visual images in general , and film in particular, b~tter.
understood in light of an overall theory of commun1cat1on
as symbolic .behavior; and what would this theory look
like?
0
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Second, he understood that his experience with novice
fi-lmmakers suggested a radical innovation in the way
the film medium could be used as a research tool. If
anyone could be taught to make a film that reflected his
or her own world view, and the values and concerns of his
or her group, then the direction of the film communication
process could be reversed. This meant using the medium
"to see whether the visual world offers a way of communication that can be used not only for us to communicate to
them, but so that we might make it easier for them to talk
to us" (1965:19).
Although these two sets of questions were pursued in
tandem, and their interconnections formed the basis of
much of Worth's intellectual development, it will be necessary for the purpose of exposition to discuss them separately.

The Navajo Project
The first fruits of the bio-documentary approach and the
realization of the potential it offered for communication by
"them to talk to us" were not long in coming. In his first
exposition of the bio-documentary film concept, at the
1964 Meeting of the Society for Applied Anthropology,
Worth already saw the possibility of using this method to
explore the world view of another culture.
In a documentary film about the Navajo you look for an objective representation of how they live as seen by an outsider. In
a Bio-Documentary about the Navajo, the film would be made
by a Navajo. One would not only look to see how the Navajo
live, but one would also look to see how a Navajo sees and
structures his own life and the world around him. [1964:5]2

•

In this capsule "proposal" for a research project, Worth
later realized he was obeying Malinowski's injunction that
"the final goal, of which an Ethnographer should never
lose sight ... is, briefly, to grasp the native's point of
view, his relation to life, to realize his vision of his world"
(1922:25). In this context, it is interesting to note Worth's
sensitivity to one of the most important but often neglected problems in anthropological theory and practice:
the influence of the researcher's own values and biases.
The proposed use of the bio-documentary approach was,
to use a term that achieved currency in later years, reflexive:
Of course no view by one man of another is entirely objective.
The most objective documentary film, or report, includes the
view and values of the maker. The standard documentary film
tries, however, to exclude as much as possible of this personal value system. The Bio-Documentary, on the other hand,
encourages and teaches the filmmaker to include and to be
concerned with his own values .... The Bio-Documentary
method teaches the maker of the film to search for the meaning he sees in his world and it encourages the viewer to
continue that search by comparing his values with the values
expressed by the filmmaker in the film. [1964:5]
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This interest in what "other people had to say about
themselves through film , and how one could teach them
to say it" (Worth and Adair 1972:30) led to the Navajo
Filmmakers Project conducted in the summer of 1966 by
Worth in collaboration with John Adair, an anthropologist
long familiar with the Navajo, and assisted by Richard
Chalfen, then a graduate student working with Worth.
The project addressed a series of research objectives
and issues:
1 To determine the feasibility of teaching the use of film to
people with another culture. [Worth and Adair 1970:11]
2 To find out if it was possible to systematize the process of
teaching; to observe it with reference to the maker, the film
itself, and the viewer; and to collect data about it so as to
assist other ongoing research exploring the inference of
meaning from film as a communicative "language." [ibid.:12]
3 [To test the hypothesis that] motion picture film , conceived ,
photographed, and sequentially arranged by a people such
as the Navajo would reveal something of their cognition and
values that may be inhibited, not observable, or not analyzable when investigation is totally dependent on verbal
exchang8-€specially when it must be done in the language
of the investigator. [ibid.]
4 [To] create new perspectives on the Whorfian hypothesis,
work on which has for the most part been limited to linguistic
investigation of cognitive phenomena. Through cross-cultural
comparative studies using film as a mode of visual communication relationships between linguistic, cognitive, cultural
and visual phenomena might eventually be clarified. [Worth
and Adair 1972:28]
5 [To see whether] the images, subjects and themes selected
and the organizing methods used by the Navajo filmmakers
would reveal much about their mythic and value systems. [It
was] felt that a person 's values and closely held beliefs about
the nature of the world would be reflected in the way he edited
his previously photographed materials. [ibid.]
6 To study the process of "guided" technological innovation
and observe how a new mode of communication would be
patterned by the culture to which it is introduced. [Worth and
Adair 1970:12]

The Navajo project was enormously successful. The
films made by the Navajo filmmakers were widely
screened and discussed as "a breakthrough in crosscultural communications" (Mead 1977:67). Worth's involvement with anthropology deepened after the completion of the project and the publication of its results (Worth
and Adair 1967, 1970, 1972). He became increasingly
identified with the revitalization of a subfield, the anthropology of visual communications, a term he proposed
as an alternative to the earlier term visual anthropology.
Worth felt that most anthropologists viewed film and
photography only as ways to make records about culture
(usually other cultures) and failed to see that they could
be studied as phenomena of culture in their own right,
reflecting the value systems, coding patterns, and cognitive processes of their maker. His experience with biodocumentary films had clarified this distinction for him

and he saw it as crucial to the understanding of visual
communications. Pursuing this distinction leads to three
issues which Worth was concerned with:
1 The denial of the possibility of an objective, value-free film
record and the assertion of an inherent cultural bias of a
filmmaker raises serious questions about the way we all
view photographic images, and our tendency to accept
them as evidence about the external world . In particular
Worth was disturbed by the lack of understanding and
sophistication on the part of anthropologists regarding
their own use of visual image technologies.
2 The use of these technologies to record the lives of others
for our purposes, and the purveying to others of our own
cultural products and technologies (again, usually for our
own profit), raise serious ethical issues about the power
and the use of media which we ourselves do not
adequately understand.
3 There is a need to understand the nature of film as a
medium of communication-is there a film code and
what are its properties?
I will begin with the last of these, which takes us back
to the question of how meaning is communicated through
film.

Film as Communication
In the process of analyzing the early bio-documentary
films made by his students, Worth had realized that although they were subject ive they were not wholly
idiosyncratic. In his discussion of these films he noted
that "the films all employ similar grammars (in the sense
of editing devices and filmic continuities) ... grammars
of argot rather than of conventional speech" (1965:18). As
I have noted , the decision to view these films as social
rather than merely individual expressions led to the question of whether there were underlying rules for the shaping and sharing of meanings in film.
Worth began by employing a communications theory
model , in which film is seen as "a signal received primarily through visual receptors, which we treat as a message
by inferring meaning from it" (ibid .:323, emphasis in original). The implications of this last point were to become
increasingly central in Worth's work, but he already was
insisting that "there is no meaning in the film itself ... the
meaning of a film is a relationship between the implication of the maker and the inference of the audience"
(ibid.). But how did this process of implying and inferring
meanings actually occur? In two of his early papers

1

Sol Worth and the Study of Visual Communications

(1966, 1968) Worth laid out an initial mode l, some of
which was retained and developed in future work, and
some of which was mod ified or discarded as his thinking
progressed.
Because much of the model of film communication
presented in these papers is repeated in the paper "The
D_evelopment of a Sem iotic of Fil m" (1969), I will briefly
d1scuss some aspects of the earlier papers which were
less prominent in the later effort. In addition, I will focu s
on what I feel are the weaknesses as well as the
achievements of Worth 's approach as represented by al l
three of these papers.
In these initial papers Worth drew heavily upon a psychological framework for understanding film , again making an analogy to the dream as an "i ntrapersonal mode of
communi cat ion through image events in seq uence. The
fi lm is a simil ar mode of communication but most often
extended to the interpersonal domain" (1968:3) . He proceeded to outline :· an intuitive experient ial model " of film
as a process which beg ins with a "Feel ing Concern ... to
communicate something ," a concern "which many psychologists feel is almost a basic human drive" (1966:327).
This feeling concern should not be seen as an explicit
message that one wants to commun icate ; it "i s most often
imprecise, amorphous, and internalized. It cannot be sent
or received as a film in th is internalized, 'fee ling' state"
(1968 :4) .

Here Worth makes a further po int which he did not
pursue at the time, but wh ich can be seen as an early
indicator of what later became an important part of his
view of communicative phenomena:
Obviously, inferences can be made about internal feel ing
states by observing a subject's gestures, body movements,
and so forth . ... [However] there is an important d ist inction
which must be made between the inferences we make from a
person 's own behavior, wh ich can have a great v.ariety of
reasons explaining and motivating them , and the inferences
we make from a coded expression in linguistic or paral ingu istic form whose purpose is primarily communicat ive. [ibid.]

If the filmmaker is to communicate this feeling concern ,
then, Worth continued, the "sender must develop a Story
Organism-an organic unit whose basic function is to
provide a vehicle that will carry or embody the Feeling
Concern" (1966:327). In practice, the story organism may
be a story in the usual sense of the word , even a shooting
script, but Worth was dealing more with the "organization
into a system of those beliefs and feelings that a person
accepts as true and related to his Feeling Concern"
(ibid. :328).
The final stage in the encoding process occurs when,
"after recognizing the feeling concern and finding the
story organism, ... the communicator [begins] to collect
the external specific Image Events which, when sequenced, will become the visible film communicati on"
(1968:4).
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Meaning as Mirror Image
Worth then proceeds to define the receiving process "as
a kind of mirror image of the sending process" (1966:328).
Because I feel that this position contains a fundamental
error (and one which Worth later recognized) , I will quote
it in full:
The viewer first sees the Image Event-the sequence of
signals that we call a film . Most often he knows nothing of
what went on before. He doesn't know the film-maker and his
personality, and he usually doesn't know what the film is
about, or is meant to communicate. Should our viewer choose
to treat these signals as a message, he will first infer the Story
Organism from the sequenced Image Events. He will become
aware of the belief system of the film-maker from the images
he sees on the screen.
From this awareness he will , if the communication "works," be
able to infer-to invoke in himself-the Feeling Concern.
As you can see from th is suggested view of the total process, the meaning of the film for the viewer is closely related to
the Feeling Concern of the film-maker. The single Image
Events of the film are the signals, these specifically sequenced Image Events are what we treat as messages, and
our inference about the Feeling Concern of the maker is what
we ca ll the meaning of the film. [1966:328]

This view is explicitly tied by Worth to a psychological
model of communication in art enunciated by Ernest Kris
in his Psychoanalytic Explorations in Art (1952). Worth
quotes Kris's statement that communication "lies not so
much in the prior intent of the artist as in the consequent
recreation by the audience of his work of art. What is
required for communication therefore is similarity between the audience process and that of the artist."
The primary problem with this argument is that it does
not, in fact, represent the experiential realities of film
communication. 3 Simply put, it is unreasonable to ever
expect the process of viewing a film to mirror the process
of making that film. Given Worth's own model of the
filmmaking process, it should be clear that the maker
interacts with the film in the process of creation in a way
which can never be repeated by himself or by anyone
else. The very acts of filmmaking are different in time,
space, and pace from any act of viewing . Moreover, the
model implies a static, unchanging feeling concern
which leads to a fixed story organism, which in turn is
represented by a sequence of image events. In reality, of
course, the process of filmmaking-as Worth's own descriptions show-often involves changes and modifications in what one wishes to say and how one tries to say it.
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The filmmaker's experience is one of choosing among
alternatives, attempting to realize intentions, and assessing achievements as a means of confirming or altering
those intentions. The viewer confronts only the arranged,
final set of images, and can only deal with them in terms
of conventional and specific expectations, and in light of
assessments of the filmmaker's control and skill in choosing, sequencing, and implying meanings. This is hardly
the same thing as "[reversing] the process by which the
encoder made the film" (1969:290).
But if this position is so patently untenable, why did
Worth hold to it for several years and repeat it in a series
of papers? I think there may be several reasons for this.
First, I believe that Worth was heavily influenced by his
e~periences in teaching students in his Documentary
F1lm Workshop. His method of teaching concentrated on
forcing the students to clearly articulate their intentions
and their decisions in selecting and arranging images in
order to convey ideas and feelings. The model of a feeling concern that leads to a story organism which is embodied in a sequence of image events may not capture
the experience of all filmmakers, but it does characterize
the method used in Worth's workshop-.
Second, the influence of the student workshop experience may have contributed another flaw of the mirrorimage model: the implication that films are typically
made by individual filmmaker-communicators. This "mistake" is all the more odd given Worth's years of experience as a professional filmmaker. There is no doubt that
he was aware that film is among the most collective of
media and that most films could in no way be described
as the embodiments of any one author's feeling concern .
Worth was certainly not a naive auteur theorist· rather 1
thi~k we can see here, again, the influence of the psy~ho
loglcally based, individually oriented communications
theory Worth was using at that time.
In his 1969 paper Worth had already begun to retreat
from his claim of isomorphism between the receiver's and
the sender's experience of a film. In this paper he gives
~everal examples of possible viewer interpretations of a
film (Red Desert by Antonioni) and concludes:
Most film communication is not. .. that perfect correspondence between the Fee!ing Concern, ~he Story Organism 1
and t.he Image Ev~nts t.hey ?1ctate, and the1r reconstruction by .
the v1ewer. Most.film s1tuat1ons, depending as they must on
the ~aker and h1~ context (both social and psychological),
the v1ewer and h1s, and the film itself, are imperfect communicative situations. [1969:295]

Note, however, that perfect communication is still defined
as the achievement of isomorphic correspondence; contex~ and other factors are still viewed as "imperfections"
wh1ch muddy the communicative stream.

Film as the Language of Visual Communication
Despite their unfortunate devotion to the mirror-image
model, these early papers were valuable for an understanding of film as communication. By using an approach
that drew upon linguistics, communications theory, and
psychology, Worth was explicitly differentiating himself
from the evaluative concerns of film theorists who approached film primarily as an art form. The title of his
1966 paper, "Film as a Non-Art," was meant to assert
provocatively this emphasis on looking "at film as a
medium of communication , rather than as an art or an art
form" (1966:322). He was determined that we understand
t~e. "difference between evaluation and meaning"
(1bld.:324):
My concern is not whether film is art or not, but whether the
process by which we get meaning from film can be understood and clarified .... While all art might be said to communicate, all communication is certainly not art. [ibid .]

Having elaborated a model of the film communication
he saw as the next step the analysis of the
med1atmg agent-the film itself.
proc~s~,

The study of the Image Event. .. -its properties, units, elements and system of organization and structure that enable
~s t~ infer meaning from a film-should be the subject of our
1nqu1ry, and of our professional concern. [ibid.]

lnyursuit of this inquiry Worth followed the analytic paths
la1d down by linguists in describing and analyzing the
structure and functionings of lexical communication. He
adopted, in fact, the heuristic strategy "that film can be
~tudied as if it were the 'language' of visual communication, and as if it were possible to determine its elements
and to understand the logic of its structure" (ibid.:331).
Worth called this visual analogue to linguistics vidistics ,
and proceeded to elaborate a model of filmic elements
and principles based on those of structural linguistics.
Vi?ist!cs in this early stage is concerned , first, with the determmatlon and description of those visual elements relevant to
the process of communication. Second, it is concerned with
t~e de.termination of the rules, laws and logic of visual relationship that h~lp a vi~wer to infer meaning from an Image
Ev~n~, and the mteract1on of Image Events in sequence. Film
as 1f 1t were language, ~~studied vidistically, is thus thought
of as t~e study of spec1f1ed elements, elements in sequence,
operat1ons on these elements, and cognitive representations
of them that act as a mediating agent in a communication
P.rocess between human beings-between a filmmaker and a
v1ewer-between a creator and are-creator. [ibid.]
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Worth presented his solution to the first of these
questions-the identification of the basic filmic unit, or
visual element-through an account of the development
of the film medium and of the theories that accompanied
its growth. This account, given first in his 1968 paper,
"Cognitive Aspects of Sequence in Visual Communication ," was elaborated in the 1969 paper "The Development of a Semiotic of Film." After presenting various
theorists' positions, Worth casts his vote with Eisenstein, who isolated the "shot" as the basic element-"the
smallest unit of film that a filmmaker uses" (1969:297).
This seemed "the most reasonable" choice, "not only because it is the way most filmmakers construct films, but
because it is also possible to describe it fairly precisely
and to manipulate it in a great variety of controlled ways"
(1969~ 299).

Moreover, the Navajo filmmakers "who were taught only
the technology of filmmaking without any rules for combining units seemed 'i ntuitively' to discover the shot as
the basic sign for the construction of their films" (ibid.).
However, as Worth himself noted in his historical account, the first filmmakers saw the "dramatic scene" as
the basic film unit. This was essentially a theatrical concept: "the first filmmakers pointed the camera at some
unit of action and recorded it in its entirety" (1968:9). It
look several years before Porter, in 1902, "discovered"
that "isolated bits of behavior could be photographed
and glued together to make a scene" (ibid.:10). In retrospect, we might wonder how naive the Navajo actually
were (most had seen at least some commercial films), or
whether Worth had been able to limit his instruction, as
intended, to "the technology of filmmaking without any
rules for combining units."
Worth used the term videme for Eisenstein's basic unit
of film communication, previously called an Image Event,
"that is accepted by viewers as something that represents the world" (1968:13). However, Worth then argued
that a finer distinction was required "if we are to attempt
further scientific analysis .... The shot is actually a
generic term for two kinds of shots: the 'camera shot' and
the 'editing shot' " (1969:299). The camera shot, which
Worth called the cademe, is "that unit of film which results from the continuous action of the movie camera ...
from the moment we press the start button to when we
release it" (ibid .). The editing shot, called the edeme, is
"formed from the cademe by actually cutting the cademe
apart and removing those segments one does not wish to
use" (1968:14). The process of filmmaking, then, involves
the shooting of cademes and their transformation (in
whole or part) into edemes. It is then possible to sequence these resultant edemes in ways that are determined by the individual filmmaker, his communication
needs, his particular culture, and his knowledge of the
"language."
The edeme thus becomes the hypothesized basic
element and building block of the language, upon which
all language operations are performed, and a basic
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image event from which all meaning is inferred (1968:14).
Much of the balance of the 1968 paper was devoted to a
discussion of parameters along which this basic element
can vary. This discussion has much in common with the
work of other writers on film (e.g., Spottiswoode 1935)
who used the "film language" concept. However, Worth
felt that "none of these authors developed a theory of
grammar embodying 'linguistic' elements or rule-like organization capable of syntactic structures" (1968:12).
In Worth's linguistic analogy, the parameters of motion,
space, and internal time are thought of as semantic elements. Sequence, however, including the manipulation of
apparent time, belongs to a discussion of the syntactic
aspects of the film "language" because it deals with more
than one edeme at a time. "Sequencing edemes can be
thought of as applying syntactic operations to edemes.
This does not in itself imply a code, a set of rules, or a
grammar-but it does make it possible to test visual
communication phenomena along these lines" (1968:17f).
Sequence becomes the fulcrum upon which Worth supported his analysis of filmic communication:
Sequence is a strategy employed by man to give meaning to
the relationship of sets of information, and is different from
series and pattern. As I will use the word here, sequence is a
deliberately employed series used for the purpose of giving
meaning rather than order to more than one image event and
having the property of conveying meaning through thesequence itself as well as through the elements in thesequence . . .. Man imposes a sequence upon a set of images
to imply meaning. [1968:18] 4

However, at this stage, Worth was still preoccupied
with the quest for a universal vidistic syntax analogous to
those identified by linguists and psycholinguists in the
analysis of lexical communication. Following Chomsky
(1957), he saw the goal of vidistics as the development of
a grammar of film syntax, "whose rules we can describe
in such a way that we can distinguish between what is a
grammatical sequence and what is an. ungrammatical
sequence" (1966:334). Unfortunately for this enterprise,
Worth admitted that he found "it almost impossible at this
point to construct a sequence of shots that an audience
will say is ungrammatical" (ibid.). Not willing to discard
the concept of grammaticality in film , Worth hoped to
utilize the notion of a semantic space having dimensions
of meaning such as that developed by Charles Osgood,
to arrive at "a grammar of probability, a system of possible, of more or less meaningful, sequences based on a
concept of dimensions of syntax" (ibid.). ·
This prospect was explored in a series of studies Worth
conducted along with Shel Feldman, a psychologist then
at the Annenberg School. Some of this work was
sketched in his 1968 paper, and further publications were
promised, but events led him to other approaches and
this line of investigation was dropped.
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The Semiotic Model
Two factors played a role in shifting Worth away from the
attempt to formulate a psychological and linguistic
model of film communication. First, the Navajo project,
which might have served to intensify his search for a
universal "psycho-logic" of visual syntax "determined by
cognitive processes that all human beings share"
(1966:339), demonstrated instead that members of a culture developed film "syntax rules" which could be related
to their lexical syntax and to their patterns of story-telling
and their systems of value and belief.
Second, as he read more widely in linguistics and,
increasingly, in the literature of semiotics-de Saussure,
Pierce, and Morris-Worth found his central concern
shifting to the role of social and cultural influences and
away from the cognitive and psycholinguistic models he
had earlier employed. 5 Rather than a grammar of film as
the language of visual communication, he now looked to
the broader scope of semiotics for an understanding of
the rules by which we make inferences from sequences of
signs.
... the development of a semiotic of film depends not on
answering linguistic questions of grammar, but on a determination of the capabilities of human beings to make inferences
from the edemes presented in certain specified ways.
[1969:317]

This shift permitted Worth to place the linguistic model
in a perspective which had previously eluded not only
him but many other film scholars. As he noted, "most
theoreticians from Eisenstein to Bazin have at one time or
another used phrases such as 'the language of film', 'film
grammar', and 'the syntax of film' " (1969:302). More insidiously, these metaphoric uses often served more as a
hindrance than an aid to the understanding of film communication. Film was all too often stretched on a Procrustean bed of linguistic models and its contours destroyed
in the attempt to fit it to an uncongenial frame. Worth
came to the realization that tremendous care must be
taken if one is to use "that most scientific of sign disciplines" for the study of film . He returned to his initial
conception of the linguistic approach as a heuristic strategy with a far more modest estimate of its utility. The
strategy had, however, led him to a better understanding
of how film might be scientifically analyzed.
I am suggesting, then, that linguistics offers us some fruitful
jumping-off places for the development of a semiotic of film,
but not a ready-made body of applicable theory leading to
viable research in film. If we accept Chomsky's definition of
language we must be forced to conclude that film is not a
language, does not have native speakers, and does not have
units to which the same taxonomy of common significance
can be applied as it can to verbal language. At this point our
aim should not be to change the definition of language so as
to include the possible rules of film, although this may well be

a result of further research in film, but rather to develop a
methodology and a body of theory that will enable us to say
with some certainty just how it is, and with what rules, that we
make implications using film signs with some hope of similar
inferences. [1969:318f]

In most of his work after 1969 Worth followed this prescription , but his focus shifted from film in particular to
the larger class of visual images in general and, although
the-two sides of the communications process were always taken into account, increasingly his primary objective was to understand better how meaning is interpreted
by viewers rather than how it is articulated by the imagemaker. Before discussing these investigations, however, I want to turn to some important papers in which
Worth applied the lessons of his theoretical research to
the practice of those engaged in the use of visual media
in anthropology and education.

The Politics of Anthropology
The most immediate application of Worth 's emerging
semiotic approach to film communication was in the field
of anthropology. I have already mentioned his involvement with the sub-discipline of visual anthropology. With
the completion of the Navajo project Worth found himself
near the center of a growing "invisible college" of anthropologists interested in going beyond the limited uses
of visual media characteristic of most work in the field.
Visual anthropology, despite the important early contributions of Bateson and Mead, had come , for the most part,
to mean the taking of photographic or film records in the
field , and the use of these materials as illustrations to
accompany verbal accounts or as "evidence" uncritically
accepted as objective records of objects and events.
In a paper presented to the American Anthropological
Association in 1968, entitled "Why Anthropology Needs
the Filmmaker," Worth took strong exception to these assumptions and to the biases and limitations they entailed .
In the first place, he maintained that we could not simply
accept photographic or film images as "evidence" because they always reflect human decisions (conscious
and unconscious) and technological constraints.
Further, he argued that by defining film exclusivelyand naively-as a record about culture, anthropologists
tended to ignore the study of film as a record of culture ,
".reflecting the value systems, coding patterns and cognitive processes of the maker" (1972a). Here, in addition to
the obvious echoes of the Navajo project, Worth is explicitly drawing upon Hymes's concept of the "ethnography of communication" in which one is interested in
what things are said (or not said), why, to whom , and in
what form .
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As a corollary of this position, Worth was led to the
view that any film can be used for ethnographic
analyses-of the culture of the film's subjects or of the
filmmaker, or both; consequently,
[t]here can therefore be no way of describing a class of films
as "ethnographic" by describing a film in and of itself. One
can only describe this class of films by describing how they
are used , and assigning the term "ethnograph ic" to one c lass
of descriptions. [1972a]

Worth's argument was controversial , for it implicitly denied the inherent ethnographic validity of much "anthropological film "-it was not ethnographic just because
an anthropologist made it. In fact, he went much further
and attacked the "visual anthropologists" for their lack of
sophisti cation in the use of film , a condition which he
attributed in part to their naive view of film as "objective
record":
The only group or professionals involved in the making and
use of anthropological films who have no training AT ALL in
the making, analysis, or use of film are anthropologists. One
can count on the anthropologists who are trained to study
films, not as a record of some datum of culture, but as a
datum of culture in its own right. [1972a:359]

By the late 1960s Worth was actively engaged in efforts to
change this state of affairs. He was involved with the
American Anthropological Association 's (AAA) Program
in Ethnographic Film (PIEF) and in 1970, in collaboration
with Margaret Mead and others, he helped found the Anthropological Film Research Institute at the Smithsonian
Institution. In the summer of 1972 he organized and
taught, along with Jay Ruby, Carroll Williams, and Karl
Heider, a summer institute in visual anthropology funded
by the National Science Foundation. That fall , at the annual meeting of the AAA, Worth was instrumental in the
transformation of PIEF into the Society for the Anthropology of Visual Communication. He served a term as president of the society and was the founding editor of its
journal , Studies in the Anthropology of Visual Communication. 6 The society and the journal provided a continuing form and context for Worth and others to advocate
and demonstrate the rich potential of the approach they
represented.

9

The Ethics of Anthropology
The issues Worth was raising in the late 1960s and early
1970s did not exist in a vacuum; in a real sense they were
in the air. Anthropologists along with the rest of academia
were facing political and social realities which cast into
question many of the untested assumptions of their disciplir.e. !n 1972 a volume of essays appeared under the title
Reinventing Anthropology, edited- by Dell Hymes, in
which sixteen authors discussed the field as a product of
"a certain period in the discovery, then domination, of the
rest of the world by European and North American
societies" (Hymes et al. 1972:5). The essays in the book
addressed many assumptions, biases, and limitations of
anthropological theory and practice, exposing flaws and
ethical problems and questioning whether it was possible to "reinvent" a more responsible and self-conscious
discipline.
Worth contributed a chapter to this book in which he
explicated many of his concerns about the way anthropologists have used and misused, understood and
misunderstood the visual media in studying and reporting about various groups around the world. He identified
a series of intellectual and ethical problems that have
resulted from the development and diffusion of visual
communication technologies.
For the field of anthropology Worth argued that "an
ethnography of communication developed on the basis
of verbal language alone cannot cope with man in an age
of visual communication" (1972b:349). He maintained, as
I have already noted, that the naive belief in film as objective record must give way to a more sophisticated understanding and use of visual media as research tools and of
visual images as research data.
Worth also criticized the inertia of academic disciplines which leads us to "continue examining and thinking about only inherited problems, rather than those
problems and modes our children, our students, and
even ourselves pay most attention to" (ibid.:350). We
cannot ignore the growing centrality of the visual media
in all cultures, not only in Western industrial society. He
spelled out in this paper some of the ways in which social
scientists can become more sensitive students of contemporary, "visual culture."
The ethical problems he articulated are more difficult
to resolve. When Worth first began to develop the biodocumentary method, he saw it as a way to learn "how
others see their world," to "make it easier for them to talk
to us" (1965:19). The Navajo project was an expression of
his belief in the potential of film to reverse the one-way
flow of most anthropological communication. But, in this
paper, he reveals a considerably less sanguine view of
the role of visual media in the lives of "others" in the
modern world.
The Navajo project had as one of its aims the study of
the "guided" introduction of a communications technology into a new cultural context. In the 1972 paper Worth is
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all too aware of the realities of technological diffusion in
the modern world. For most cultures and societies the
question is not whether they will encounter and come to
live with these new visual media, but when and how.
In teaching people to read, we implicitly teach them what to
read .. . . The use of a mode of communication is not easily
separable from the specific codes and rules about the content of that mode. [1972b:351]

One central problem, therefore, is that our technologies
may carry with them "our conceptions, our codes, our
mythic and narrative forms" (ibid. :353) unless we also
make clear to other cultures that these new media "need
not be used only in the ways of the ... societies that introduce them" (ibid.).
Another ethical question raised in this paper focused
on the importance of control over information as an instrument of power. Worth noted that "anthropologists
are notorious for studying everyone but themselves"
(ibid. :355). Is it appropriate for us to encourage others to
reveal themselves when we do not? As visual technologies spread to groups in our society and to other
cultures unused to manipulating these media,
what is our responsibility to help them to understand a world
in which their every act of living can be televised and viewed
by a watching world? .. . Should we teach them not only to
make their own films but to censor ours as well? The problem
as I see it is: What reasons do we have not to insist that others
have the right to control how we show them to the world?
[ibid. :355-358]

Film in Education
Although I have concentrated on Worth's extensive involvement with anthropology, some of his earliest
academic endeavors were in the field of education. His
interest in this area was revived in 1971 when he was
invited to contribute to a Yearbook which was to focus on
communication and education. He agreed to write a
paper on the use of film in education and he took the
opportunity to draw together and to clarify several
strands in his previous and current thinking.
Worth began by examining three perspectives which
he saw as exercising major-and pernicious-influence
on "the educational and film communities but with very
little research evidence in their support" (1974a:273).
First, and most intensely, he takes issue with Rudolf Arnheim 's position, which he characterized as "visual primacy." Worth argued that Arnheim's theory of "visual
thinking" carries to an unreasonable extreme the "reasonable assertion that visual perception contains or is
part of what we normally call'thinking"' (ibid.).

1 believe that this is a fair characterization of Arnheim's
work, and Worth goes on to pinpoint some of its major
flaws. Rejecting in Arnheim an extreme version of the
psychological, perceptual-cognitive "bias" he himself
had earlier manifested (although he never expressed
such a strongly "Gestalt" position), Worth concluded that
Arnheim "underestimates or denies the extent to which
symbolic systems or conventions mediate our knowledge
of the world" (ibid.) .
The particular error Worth located in Arnheim was most
clearly manifested in his denial of the cruc ial role of culture in determining what and how we "see":

True visual education presupposes that the world can present
its inherent order to the eye and that seeing consists in understanding this order. [Arnheim 1966:148]

In contrast to this position Worth aligned himself with
most contemporary thinkers in saying that
what we see and what we think about is determined at the
least as much by our symbolic systems and convent ions for
representing that universe as by the universe itself.
[197 4a:278]

Worth went on to outline the other two perspectivesthat of certain film theorists (represented by Gene
Youngblood) and film educators-which he felt were as
inadequate and misleading in their own areas as Arnheim was in his. What these criticisms have in common is
Worth's dismay at the failure of so many researchers and
educators properly to understand or utilize film as a
process of communication.
In the remaining sections of the paper Worth presented
his own current view of how film could be understood as
communication and how knowledge of this process enables us to use film in the very process of education
itself. He restates an abbreviated version of the feeling
concern/story organism/image event model (these terms
are not used), but with several significant modifications.
In this account the complexity and non-linearity of the
filmmaking process are now emphasized, moving the
model away from the somewhat misleading implication
that the filmmaker moves in strict, irreversible steps from
feeling to story to image sequence. However, the model
is still conceived in "single author" terms. This is shown
explicitly when Worth describes the completion of
filmmaking:
At some point he decides to "release" his film. It is now no
longer a personal act but a public and social one; it is a
symbolic form available for participation in a communication
process. [ibid.:285]
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Worth was also ready to abandon the mirror-image
model of viewer reception , if somewhat re luctantly:
When another person sees this fil m, he must (depending on
how one talks about such acts) receive it, decode it, or recreate it. Since meaning or content does not exist within the
reel of acetate, the viewer must recreate it from the forms,
codes, and symbol ic events in the fil m.... For communi cation to occur, meaning must be implied by the creator and
inferred by the viewer or re-creator. [ibid.]

Note that, while perfect communication is no longer
defined in terms of the viewer's ability to trace the
filmmaking process in reverse and reach the author's
feeling concern , the term inology suggests an ambivalence that probably reflects a genuine state of intellectual
trans ition. Worth shifts between "receive ," "decode," and
"re-create" to describe the viewer's role in the process of
communication , still echoing the isomorphic implications
of "recreation " as he had used the term in earlier papers.
Yet he also makes explicit the role of "conventions
through which meaning is transmitted between people
by a process of implication and inference" (ibid.).
Worth was now coming to focus more and more on the
process of interpretation-how meaning is created by
viewers-rather than on the process of articulation by
imagemakers (as in the bio-documentary and Navajo
projects). In order to clarify the importance of this shift, I
have to backtrack to an earlier stage in Worth's work.

Ignoring Interpretation
In one of his earliest papers Worth had introduced a discussion of audience reactions to his students' films with
the comment, "Perhaps, in an attempt to understand a
particular act of communication we can approach understanding by examining the reaction to the act, rather than
the act itself" (1965:3). However, in most of his work over
the next six years Worth focused more on the act of making than on that of interpreting meaning from images. In
the study of bio-documentaries made by various groups
in our society (reported in Worth and Adair 1972, Chapter
15), and in the Navajo project, it was the films and the
activity of the filmmakers, not the viewers, that Worth was
interested in.
In his 1966 paper, "Film as a Non-Art," Worth appeared
willing to forego the investigation of the interpretive side
of the communicative process:
This particular area of study-the interaction between persons and groups, and the stimuli they relate to-has been
undertaken by the social and behavioral scientists. Although
relevant to our interests, the specific study of the relationships
between peop!e and events cannot be the professional concern of those interested in visual communicat ion. [1966:330]
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Although I believe he was primarily distancing himself
from an overly subjective approach which centers on individual viewers' reactions, Worth is clearly advocating
the priority of the "study of the Image Event" itself. The
extent of this "bias" is shown by the perfunctory way in
which Worth and Adair assessed the reactions of other
Navajo to the films made by their fellows. The account
given by Worth and Adair of the films' world premiere on
the reservation (attended by 60 Navajo) is the shortest
chapter in their book (1972:128--131), but it is most
revealing.
They make clear the fact that the idea of holding the
screening at all originated with the filmmakers, not the
researchers. More importantly, the account reveals how
unprepared they were for this crucial opportunity to investigate the interpretations and responses of the Navajo
viewers. Only nine viewers were questioned, and the
questions failed to explore fully their reactions.
Two of the Navajo reported that they did not understand
certain of the films. These were films judged by Worth
and Adair to be "somewhat outside the framework of
Navajo cognition" (ibid.) either in form or subject matter.
The way these viewers expressed their lack of understanding was to say that they didn't get the meaning because the films "were in English." This is a most intriguing
response, considering that none of the films had any
sound at all. However, Worth and Adair continue:
Since these interviews were conducted in Navajo, we didn't
see the translated tapes until we left the reservation, and have
not been able to question our informants further along these
lines. [ibid.:131]

By the early 1970s, in contrast, Worth was clearly insisting on the need to include the perspectives of both the
interpreter and the imagemaker within the scope of investigation . In part, as I have indicated, this insistence was
influenced by Hymes's advocacy of an "ethnography of
communication." 7 However, in order to fully describe the
development of Worth's work at this time, I have to discuss my own involvement with it.
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Personal Interlude
I met Sol Worth in the spring of 1968 when I visited the
Annenberg School for the first time. My decision to join
the faculty of the school (as opposed to taking a job in the
field-social psychology-in which I had just received a
Ph.D.) was motivated in large part by Worth's presence. It
was immediately clear that we shared a strikingly similar
set of interests and intellectual inclinations; and it was
Worth who convinced me that my interests in the study of
art and culture could be pursued far more readily in a
communications program, where they were seen as central, than in a psychology department where (I already
knew) they would be seen as peripheral. Certainly, my
experience with the psychology of art subfield had been
disappointing: those who seemed to have a feeling for art
used poor psychology (e.g., Arnheim), while those who
were psychologically rigorous did not seem to understand art (e.g., Berlyne). The field of communications-at
least as it was represented at the Annenberg Schoolappeared to offer a framework in which the varieties of
symbolic behavior (especially the kinds we call art)
could be studied with a sensitivity to the role of psychological, social, and cultural determinants.
From the outset Worth and I engaged in discussions
and arguments which helped both of us clarify and, I
hope, improve our understanding of communications
phenomena. In these discussions, I made clear my belief
that the interpreter's role was at the center of the communicative process. Put most simply, I argued that before
one could become a "sender" one had to become a "receiver." The competence needed for articulation derived
in large part from one's prior experience in interpretation.
Specifically, in the realm of art I maintained that "the
process of artistic creation itself presupposes and arises
out of the process of appreciation" (Gross 1973:115).
This position reflected two basic considerations. The
first was the simple fact of ontological sequence: we all
encounter symbolic events first as consumers and only
later, if at all, as producers. "Only upon the basis of the
competence to appreciate meaning presented in a symbolic mode can one hope to achieve the realization of
creative potential in that mode" (Gross 1974:71).
Second, I was arguing that symbolic behavior occurs
in a variety of distinct modes, and that meaning can be
understood or purposively communicated only within
these modes. "These modes are partially but not totally
susceptible to translation into other modes. Thus they are
basically learned only through actions appropriate to the
particular mode" (ibid.:57).

Two papers which I wrote in 1971-1972 presented the
outlines of a theory of symbolic competence and aesthetic communication which incorporated this position
(1973, 1974). These papers and the theory they presented
owed much to Worth's influence. At the same time my
views and emerging theoretical formulations helped
shape his views on a number of isues. The paper Worth
wrote on film and education reflects our discussions. By
the fall of 1971 these discussions had led-via an informal research seminar we conducted-to collaborative
projects carried out by several of our students, and eventually to a joint paper.
Th is paper, written in 1972-1973 and publ ished in 1974,
presents the out Iines of a theory of interpretation-the
assignment of meaning to objects and events. Because I
feel that the presentation in the paper is often unclear and
overly terse , and because the model introduced in th is
paper figures importantly in Worth's subsequent writings,
I will risk the appearance of immodesty and attempt to
remedy some of the paper's defic ienc ies by discussing
its contents in somewhat greater detail than I have devoted to the other papers.

Interpretive Strategies
The questions we focused on in our discussions and research centered around the pecu liar properties of visual
images. Although our paper addressed the general issue
of how people assign meaning to objects and events, in
retrospect it seems clear that our concerns were mostly
directed towards the visual mode in general , and film or
photographic images in particular. The basic question
we were asking might be phrased as: what can we
"know" from these images and how can we know it? We
felt that the first step towards an answer was to draw two
basic d istinctions in describing interpretive processes.
The first distinction we made was between those objects and events which do and those which do not "evoke
the use of any strategy to determine their meaning "
(Worth and Gross 1974:29). Most of the objects and
events we encounter are interpreted "transparently" in the
sense that we "know what they mean" without any conscious awareness on our part of any interpretive activity.
We generally respond to their presence (or absence) in a
way which ind icates (analytical ly) that a process of tacit
interpretation has occurred: our behavior has been affected by the presence (or absence) of some object/event
in some fashion . We simply haven't needed to "think
about it." Such tacit interpretations range from our "unthinkingly" extending our hand to open a closed door
when we leave a room , to our ability to drive a car along a
familiar route wh ile absorbed in conversation or reverie.
Worth and I used the term "non-sign events" to identify
the events that we ignore or code "transparently." The
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objects and events which do evoke an interpretive process we called sign events. However, we continued , these
are not predetermined or fixed classes :
It is important to note that the distinction between sign and
non-sign events must not be taken as a categorical classification of persons, objects, and events. Any event, depend ing
upon its context and the context of the observer, may be
assigned sign value. By the same token , any event may be
disregard ed and not treated as a sign. [ibid .]

The purpose of this first distinction, therefore, was not
to isolate two kinds of objects and events in the world, but
two ways in which we respond to the presence or absence of objects and events. Having made this distinction we turned our attention to the ways in wh ich sign
events are interpreted. Our second discrimination was
between those sign events we called natural and those
we called symbolic.
Natural events, as we used the term , are those wh ich
we interpret in terms of our knowledge (or bel ief) about
the conditions that determine their existence. The meaning of these events for us, in fact, can be said to deri~e
precise ly from those existential conditions. They are Informative about the stable and/or trans ient conditions of
the physical , biolog ical , and/or social forces that determined their occurence (or non-occurrence) and configuration. The important point here is that, while we assign
meanings to such events on the basis of knowledge (or
belief) about the forces that caused them to exist, we do
not see them as having been caused (to any important
degree) in order to convey these meanings to us_. Therefore, while they inform us about those factors wh1ch we
assume (or know) to have caused their occurrence, we do
not sense an authorial intent behind them.
Natural events may be produced by either human or
non-human agency. "However, the signness of a natural
event exists only and solely because, within some context, human beings treat the event as a sign" (i~id.) : To
give a simple example, if I observe a tree bendmg 1n the
wind , my knowledge of meteorology may lead me to
interpret it as a sign of a coming storm. My interpretation
is based upon my knowledge of the forces that caused
the event to occur.
Similarly, I may decide that a person I observe on the
street is a former member of the armed forces because I
notice that he has a crew cut, very erect posture, and
walks with a slight limp. In this case I would be basing my
interpretation upon stereotypic knowledge of the f_ac_tors
that would result in this configuration of charactenst1cs.
Needless to say, I could be mistaken. The point, of
course, is that I would be treating the signs I attende~ to
as informative about stable and/or transient charactenstics of the persons I observe and/or their interactions with
the situations in which I observe them.

13

In contrast, symbolic events are events we assume to
have been intended to communicate something to us.
Further, we assume that these events are articulated by
their "author" in accord with a shared system of rules of
implication and inference. That is, they are determined
not by physical or psychological "laws" but by semiotic
conventions. To assess a sign event as symbolic, then, is
to see it as a "message" intended by its "author" to imply
meaning(s) which can be inferred by those who share the
appropriate code.
If I were to observe, for example, that the man I saw on
the street, in addition to having a crew cut, erect posture,
and a slight limp, wore a lapel pin which read "V.F.W.," I
could then draw the inference that he was, in fact, a
veteran and , moreover, that he was communicating rather
than merely revealing this fact (I leave aside the obvious
possibility of deception, both communicative and "existential").
Worth and I called the interpretation of natural events
"attribution" and the interpretation of symbolic events "inference." The former term was adapted from the area of
attribution theory within social psychology. Originally developed by Fritz Heider in the 1940s, and revived in the
late 1960s by Harold Kelley (1967) and others, attribution
theory focuses on the process by which individuals interpret events "as being caused by particular parts of the
environment" (Heider 1958:297). However, our use of the
term attribution as a label for the interpretation of natural
events is narrower than that used in social psychology,
because we limited it to those interpretations which do
not assume authorial intention .
On the basis of these distinctions we proposed a definition of communication which , in effect, is limited to the
articulation and interpretation of symbolic events:
Commun ication shall therefore be defined as a social process, within a context, in which signs are produced and transmitted , perceived , and treated as messages from which
mean ing can be inferred . [Worth and Gross 1974:30]

Although I have presented these distinctions and definitions in a rather general fashion, we had in mind a
particular set of events and situations-those not obviously and easily defined as natural or as symbolic. We
were interested, that is, in what we termed ambiguous
meaning situations.
Most of the time there is little difficulty in deciding
whether an object or event we notice is natural or symbolic. Most people who might observe the wind bending
a tree outside their window and decide to take an umbrella when they go out would not think the wind was
"telling" them that it might rain. Similarly, if we meet
someone who speaks English with a distinct accent we
may attribute foreign origin to the person but we are unlikely to decide that the accent was intended to communicate the speaker's origin (however, if we find out that
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the speaker left his or her native country many years
before at an early age, we may wonder about that assessment).
When we encounter a symbolic event, on the other
hand, we are likely to see it as intentionally communicative. We usually have little difficulty recognizing these as
communications addressed to us as individuals or as
members of a group, provided we know the code. And we
usually have little difficulty interpreting them, again providing we know the code. Traffic lights are rarely mistaken for Christmas decorations.
One further clarification needs to be made. We were
focusing on the perspective of the person who observes
the sign event and interprets it. A sign event is symbolic
(i.e., communicative) only if it is taken as having been
formed (to an important degree) with the intent of telling
something to the observer. That is, if the observer is
watching two people converse and knows that they are
unaware they are being observed, their conversation ,
while it is a communicative event for them, is a natural
event for the observer. It was not intended to tell the observer anything, and so it can only be seen as informative
about the speakers' stable and/or transient characteristics as revealed in that situation. Of course , certain aspects of the observed event, such as the participants'
clothing or hairstyles, might be assessed as being "messages" addressed not just to the other participant but to
the "public" at large; these aspects might then be assessed as symbolic vis-a-vis our observer.

Life vs. Art
With all these concepts in mind, we turn to events we
encounter not through direct observation but through
photographs or film. Here we find the situation to be more
complex and more interesting. The point of the exercise,
really, was to develop a way of dealing with the interpretation of those mediated events (although mediation can
occur through words and paintings, etc., as well, photographic mediation is the most ambiguous and therefore
the most interesting case).
In our paper we make the suggestion (supported by
empirical studies) that there is a learning process by
wh1ch we come to know how to interpret mediated symbolic events such as films. At the simplest level we
merely recognize the existence of persons, objects, and
events in the film and rnake attributions about them
based on our stereotypic knowledge of such things in
real life. With somewhat more sophistication we can see
relationships between objects and events that are contiguous in time and/or space-they go together. The cru-

cial step, then, is to see this contiguity as the result of an
intention to tell us something-to see it as a sequence or
pattern which is ordered
for the purpose of implying meaning rather than contiguity to
more than one sign event and having the property of conveying meaning through the order itself as well as through elements in that order. [ibid.:32]

The final stage in this hierarchical process is when we
recognize the structure of a sign event, an awareness of
the relations between non-contiguous elements and their
implicative-inferential possibilities: the beginning and
end of a story, variations on a theme, prosodic
patterns, etc.
When we look at a scene recorded on film we need
to decide whether the event was (among other possibilities): (1) "captured candidly" as ~t unfolded naturally
in front of the camera, with the participants seeming not
to know they were being filmed ; (2) photographed unobtrusively so that, while the participants knew about it, it
was done in such a way that they "almost forgot" they
were being filmed; or (3) scripted, staged, and directed
by an "author" working with actors.
If we settle on the first alternative, we are likely to feel
justified in making attributions about the persons in the
film (their characteristics, their feelings, their relationships, etc.). If we choose the second alternative we may
feel somewhat less col}fident in making such attributions,
as we wi II feel that the behavior we observe was somewhat constrained by their knowledge that they were
being filmed. That is, their behavior may be less informative because we know it is also "messageful."
If we take the third alternative we are unlikely to make
attributions of the former sort; here we will interpret the
scene in light of our knowledge of dramatic conventions.
These conventions may be nearly the same as the attri butional stereotypes we use in the first two instances (consequently they might lead us to similar interpretations),
and this is not surprising: naturalistic conventions in
?rama aim precisely at evoking attributional knowledge
1n order to convey "lifelikeness" to characters and situations. However, they need not be the same. We may
" ~now" that the cowboy in the black hat is the bad guy
Without also believing that anyone we see in real life
wearing a black hat is a criminal.
The point is that, although events encountered in "life"
and in "art" may look the same, we make different assumptions about the factors that determine their occurrence and configuration. Because the conclusions
reached may be the same, in order to decide whether an
interpretation is attributional (the observer is assessing
the event as "life"-a natural event) or inferential (the
observer is assessing the event as "art"-a symbolic
event), we need to know the grounds on which it would be
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justified. If asked how we know something we have con?luded about an event we have observed, we might say it
IS because of what we know about the way such things
happen (attributional interpretation); or we might say we
know it because we are assuming the event was made to
happen that way in order to tell us something (communicational inference).
We hoped that this model would clarify some issues
Worth had addressed in earlier papers. Most immediately, it allowed us to say that the tendency to see
films as objective records of events rather than as a
filmmaker's statement about events derived from a confusion of interpretive strategies. The naivete Worth had attacked in many anthropologists and others who were filmically unsophisticated took the form of assuming filmed
events could uncritically be interpreted as natural. What
such viewers failed to understand was that all mediated
events are to some degree symbolic. There are always
decisions made by the mediating agent-what to shoot
(and consequently, what not to shoot) and how; and having shot, how to edit the footage (one rarely sees raw
footage); and finally when, where, and how to exhibit the
finished film.
A sophisticated viewer will recognize that the persons,
objects, and events in a film are there at least in part
because the filmmaker included them intentionally; that
the sequence of events in the film has been ordered by
the filmmaker's intention to say something by putting
them in that order (which may not be the order in which
they actually occurred) ; and that the overall structure of
the film reflects the filmmaker's intention and ability to
use implicational conventions in order to communicate to
viewers who are competent to draw the appropriate
inferences.
From this perspective it should be clear why Arnheim's
statement that "the world can present its inherent order to
the eye and that seeing consists in understanding this
order" so infuriated Worth. He saw this view as contributing to the kind of approach to film represented by
Youngblood's advocacy of a cinema which was "entirely
personal . .. rests on no identifiable plot and is not probable. The viewer is forced to create along with the film"
(Youngblood 1970:64). Worth's response to this was
fierce :
Tyros in the arts always forget that creation and originality
cannot even be recognized (or perceived) except within a
context of convention and rule-like behavior-especially in
the arts. It is not within the context of an ordered universe that
art exists, but rather within the context of man's conventions
for ordering that universe.[1974:282]
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Cracking the Code
In the period following the initial development of our
theory of interpretation Worth devoted much of his attention to the elaboration and extension of this approach to
understanding how people derive meanings from visual
images. He was interested in exploring both the properties which were unique to visual communication and
those which could be generalized to other symbolic
modes. One of his first efforts in the latter direction came
in response to a request that he prepare a commentary
on a special issue of New Literary History devoted to
metaphor.
Worth began his paper with the observation that "every
author [in the issue] 'assumes' that metaphor is a verbal
event-a verbal 'thing' of some sort" (1974b:195). He then
posed the question of whether-and how-the concept
of metaphor could be applied to events in other modes.
The answer he gave was that "metaphor is a structure
composed of elements in any mode ... related in certain
ways" (ibid.:196). The rest of the paper was largely directed towards an analysis of the metaphoric possibilities
of visual images and the argument that "visual structures
can clarify a general and abstract notion of metaphor"
(ibid. :197).
Worth described several examples of filmic metaphors
and said that the problems they raise are those of "syntactic forms for nonverbal matters for which we have very
little social agreement" (ibid.:199). How do we know what
such metaphors mean?
When Eisenstein used a sequence in his film Strike in
which a close-up of a factory foreman (who has informed
the cossacks about a coming strike) is followed by a
close-up of a jackal, audiences interpret this as "akin to
the verbal notion of 'the informer is a jackal"' (ibid.:198).
Or, to repeat an earlier example, we "know" that the cowboy in the black hat is the bad guy. Worth's point here
was that the understanding of metaphor depends upon
our ability to apply the correct interpmtive strategy to
infer the implied meaning:
Metaphor is a communicational code depending upon the
recognition of structure and the assumption of intention on the
part of the "articulator" ... of the form we are to treat as
metaphor. [ibid.:200]

For example, it is our recognition of metaphoric intention that tells us Eisenstein has sequenced his shots in
order to imply that foreman= jackal, and that we should
not read these as merely contiguous events. In this case,
the brief introduction of the jackal shot as a "break" in the
plot signals us that it is a metaphoric comment rather
than a narrative development. "The important point is that
every culture provides its 'native speakers' in any mode
with a code for interpretation" (ibid. :202).
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Worth devoted the second half of the paper to an
analysis of caricature as visual metaphor. Using Sparshott's conception (in the collection he was discussing)
that metaphor is "talking about something as it is not,"
Worth suggests that
metaphor might most fruitfully be understood in comparison
with theories and concepts of caricature rather than with
theories of representation. [ibid.:204]

Noting that verbal metaphors are statements which are
neither literally true nor false, Worth says that a caricature
is
a structure that reveals a set of meanings intended to communicate a certain set of relationships within some understood or understandable context and bounds .... A caricature is . . . a structure that relates several elements on one
level (in shorthand-that of "reality") with elements on another
level (the symbolic). It puts things together both as they are
and as they are not, and the point of caricature, like that of
metaphor, is that neither is only a "portrait." [ibid.]

Metaphor, in Worth's analysis, thus becomes a central
component of the structural code we learn "for the intentional creation of meaning within specific contexts"
(ibid. :209). It is a particularly rich syntactical device for
implying and inferring meanings in each mode of symbolic experience.
Knowing about metaphor means knowing how to organize the
universe within our minds, knowing systems of myth, of
grammar, of behavior, value and art as they are defined by our
group now, and have been in the past. [ibid .:208]

What Pictures Can Say
The larger questions raised by Worth's analysis of
metaphor were addressed in his next paper, in which he
set out "to begin an exploration into how, and what kinds
of things pictures mean" and also to explore "how the way
that pictures mean differs from the way such things as
'words' or 'languages' mean" (1975:85). 8
The title of the paper, "Pictures Can't Say Ain't," signals
one of its main arguments, namely that among things
pictures cannot imply are negative statements. But before
getting to that point, Worth began by discussing the general status of pictures as symbolic events.
Using the model of symbolic vs. natural events first
presented in our joint paper, Worth argued that a picture
is never a natural event, but always a "created social
artifact." He then recounts the notions of attribut ional interpretation as contrasted with communication inference,
making the point that an appropriate interpretation of any
picture always assumes that it was structured intentionally for the purpose of implying meaning. Worth invokes
Grice's classic analysis of intention and meaning, quoting Grice's view that not merely must a symbolic event
have been articulated "with the intention of inducing a
certain belief but also the utterer must have intended an
audience to recognize the intention behind the utterance"
(Grice 1957:382).
The next point Worth emphasizes is that we must learn
to interpret pictures by learning the system of conventions-the code-used by their makers to imply meanings. Pictures cannot be taken as merely "corresponding "
to reality, and therefore we do not merely "recognize"
what they mean ; we infer meanings on the basis of
learned conventions.
Worth here is arguing against two groups who have
denied that pictures carry intentional meaning: certain
logical positivists and linguists who believe that only "the
linguistic mode is capable of meaning" (Worth 1975:93),
and others, including some artists, who feel that pictures
can mean anything anyone sees in them. "No artistic
impl ication should .. . become a grab bag for everyone
to reach into and pull out what he himself has put in"
(ibid. :97).
It we take art seriously as communication, we must
acknowledge the separate roles and respons ibilities of
the artist and the audience. Each performs a distinct and
complementary task in the communicative process. The
audience doesn't make the work, but interprets it:
. . . the reader ... does not write any part of the poem, any
more than the viewer paints the picture or makes the film. The
reader (viewer), if he can participate in a communicat ions
event, recogni zes the work's structure, assumes an intention
to mean on the part of the creator, and proceeds to his extremely comp lex job of making inferences from the implications he can recognize. [ibid.]
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Turning next to the question of what "pictures cannot do
that words can do," Worth answers that "pictures cannot
deal with what is not"; they can't say ain't. After disposing
of several trivial examples of what might be seen as pictorial negation, calling these "linguistic uses of visual form
which become sign events in a special language" (e.g.,
"no smoking" images), he discusses the general concept
of what pictorial images affirm or deny.
Although much of "what is pictured is often valued for
what it negates by leaving out," pictures cannot specify,
out of all the things that are not shown, which the painter
means to say are not the case. "All that pictures can show
is whatis-on the picture surface" (ibid .:98).
On the other hand, pictures should also not be taken as
necessarily affirming the existence of what they do show.
Worth draws a connection between the fact that pictures
seem to show us things-particularly photographs, which
we tend to believe are the product of a machine that "tells
it like it is"-and our tendency to see "false" pictures not
as negations but as false affirmations.
Pictures in and of themselves are not propositions that make
true or false statements; that we can make truth tables about,
or that we can paraphrase in the same medium. Pictures, it
must be remembered , are not representations or correspondences, with or of, reality. Rather, they const itute a "reality" of their own. [ibid. :102]

But, if this is the case, how do we make sense of pictures? What do they tell us and how? Worth gives two
answers: first, pictures imply-and we infer-an existential awareness of particular persons, objects, and events
that are ordered and structured so as to imply meanings
by the use of specific conventions ; second, "what Larry
Gross [1973] has termed the communication of competence." Pictures communicate the skill and control with
which their structures have been manipulated according
to a variety of rules, conventions, and contexts.
Pushing the argument further, Worth reiterates the point
that "matching to the real world is insufficient to explain
how pictures mean," and goes on to say that
correspondence, if it makes any sense as a concept, is not
correspondence to "reality" but rather corresponde~ce to
conventions, rules, forms and structures for structunng the
world around us. What we use as a standard for correspondence is our knowledge of how people make picturespictorial structures-how they made them in the past, ho~
they make them now, and how they will make them for vanous
purposes in various contexts. [ibid::104]

Worth's answer, then, to the question he had posed at the
beginning of the paper is that pi~tur~s commu.nicate "the
way picture makers structure the1r d1alogue w1th the
world."
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Toward an Ethnographic Semiotic
Worth's theoretical investigations did not draw him away
from his concern with the development of a discipline
which studies visual communications in a fashion compatible with that theory. In 1976 he delivered a paper at a
symposium honoring Margaret Mead on her 75th birthday (1980). That paper adressed the need for scholars to
understand properly the uses and the limitations of visual
communications.
He distinguished between the use of visual images
and media as research tools and as research material. In
the case of the former he used Margaret Mead's work with
Gregory Bateson as an example of how pictures can be
used by a researcher to illustrate patterns of culture . The
point he felt needed to be emphasized once again-it is
a point we all forget too easily-is that "the photo is not
the pattern" but something we use as evidence to illustrate pattern.
Taking photographs, or looking or taking notes are tools for
articulating and stating patterns we, as anthropologists, wish
to show to others. [ibid .:17]

And there is an important corollary: the value of the photograph lies in the analysis. The researcher-photographer
who understands what patterns he or she wishes to present will take photographs which will be capable of showing these patterns to others. Success is not a matter of
luck but of training , skill, and intention. Bateson's and
Mead's photographs are valuable because of their
knowledge of what they were photographing and why
they were photographing.
The reason their photographs and films are records is that
they were taken in ways which allowed them to be analyzed
so as to illustrate patterns observed by scientists who know
what they were looking for. [ibid .]

The second use of photographs and films is as objects
and events which can be studied in the context of the
culture within which they were used. Here the pattern is in
the picture and the context(s) of its making. These images are analyzed as parts of culture in their own right,
"just as conversations, novels, plays, and other symbolic
behavior have been understood to be" (ibid.).
This latter approach is one Worth was later to call
ethnographic semiotics, the study of how actual people
make and interpret a variety of visual images and events.
These images and events range from the personal and
private to the collective and public, from painting and
sculpture through television, movies, and photographs
(including home movies, snapshots, and photo-albums),
store windows, and other forms of everyday presentation
of self through visual means.
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Here one looks for patterns dealing with, for example, what
can be photographed and what cannot, what content can be
displayed , was actually displayed, and how that display was
organized and structured. Was it arranged according to how
these people tell stories? To how they speak, or to the very
language and grammar that they use? [ibid.]

In the last two years of his life Worth gave considerable
attention to the formulation of an empirical application of
his concept of an ethnographic semiotics. He was determined to demonstrate rather than merely to advocate the
feasibility and validity of l:lis aproach to the study of visual
communications. At the time of his death he was preparing two grant applications. The first was for a fellowship
that would give him a year in which to write a book,
Fundamentals of Visual Communication, which would
present a framework through which the process and
structure people use to make interpretations of our visual
universe might be understood.
The second application was for a grant to support a
project he proposed to conduct with Jay Ruby. That project, to be carried out over a period of three years, was to
be a study of the visual symbolic environment of a small
American community in central Pennsylvania. This was
an enormously ambitious and exciting project, proposing
to use as the unit of analysis not specific symbolic products but the "context-the community and the community
members' interaction with visual symbolic events."
In his paper honoring Margaret Mead Worth noted, "I
am aware that, even as we try to develop a history in this
field, we also are in many ways that same history." Sol will
remain an important part of the history of studying visual
communications.
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In the preparation of this introduction I benefited from comments and
suggestions by George Custen , Paul Messaris, Jay Ruby, and Tobia L.
Worth . I also drew upon Richard Chalfen's paper, "The Contributions of
Sol Worth to the Anthropology of Visual Communication."
The choice of the Navajo in this example was not accidental. Worth
had already been discussing this idea with John Adair, a longtime
student of the Navajo, who later collaborated with him on the project.
I should mention here the fact that Worth's later repudiation of the
mirror-image model was in large part the resu lt of many discussions
between the two of us during the period 1968-1972. The arguments
summarized in this paragraph represent the position I maintained in
opposition to the implication on Worth's part of sender-receiver
"isomorphism " in the communication process.
I should alert the reader that later, in our joint paper, "Symbolic Strategies" (1974) , this terminology was significantly altered. Needing a
general term for intentionally articulated arrangements of elements,
Worth and I used "order" for this purpose, using "sequence" to designate temporal orderings and "pattern" to designate spatial orderings of
sign elements. In contrast to "order" we used the term "contigu ity " to
designate the "juxtaposition of units or events over time, space or
position" (1974 :32) where the perceiver does not assume that this arrangement was intended to imply mean ing(s).
A major influence on Worth's thinking at this time was the emerging
field of sociol inguistics. In particular, he was impressed with the work
of Dell Hymes, who had come to the University of Pennsylvania in
1965.
As of the Spring 1980 issue (6:1), the name of the journal was changed
to Studies in Visual Communication.
Richard Chalfen , who had assisted on the Navajo project, was at that
time conduct ing dissertation research which combined the approaches of Worth and Hymes. Chalfen used the term "soc iovidistics"
to designate an "ethnography of film communicat ion" (Cha lfen 1974,
1977).
Many of these questions were also addressed in a later paper, "Man Is
Not a Bird " (1978) .
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